2019-2020 Legislative Memorandum

Subject: Equality of rights and protection against discrimination
S.517-C (Krueger)

Position: SUPPORT

The concept of equality under the law is a foundational principle of our democracy, yet our federal and state constitutions were written at a time when their promises of equality only protected the interests of a few. Today, our constitutional protections remain woefully inadequate. Indeed, our state constitution provides no tools for dismantling the inequality, racism and misogyny that remain deeply embedded in our social, economic and political institutions.

The New York Constitution must be amended to include robust protections against discrimination that effectively work to hold our state and its institutions accountable for dismantling systemic discrimination. S.517-C (Krueger) proposes an Equal Rights Amendment that would do just that.

The NYCLU strongly supports this measure. Given the grave consequences of inaction, these changes cannot wait.

The Gaps in New York’s Current Constitutional Equality Protections

Adopted in 1938, the New York Constitution’s equal protection and civil rights provision fails to reflect our current vision of equality.1 To begin, by its terms, the existing language of the provision only protects against discrimination based on race or religion, but fails to prohibit discrimination against other groups that have been historically targeted as the subject of discrimination.

Beyond its narrow categories of prohibited discrimination, New York’s constitutional provision has been further limited by judicial interpretation in two significant ways.

First, the New York Court of Appeals has held that the first sentence of Article I, Section 11 – which in form is a classic “equal protection clause” – is “no more broad in its coverage than its ... prototype” in the federal constitution.2 So, as the federal equal protection clause prohibits

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1 N.Y. State Constitution, Article I, §11 currently provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.”

only intentional discrimination, the state constitutional provision is similarly limited. But a prohibition on intentional discrimination alone fails to address the discriminatory effects of seemingly neutral policies, and is simply inadequate to dismantle systemic discrimination.

Second, the Court of Appeals has also ruled that the second sentence of Article I, Section 11 – which is regarded as a “civil rights clause” because of its prohibition of specified forms of discrimination – is not self-executing and therefore does not create a private right of action. Rather, according to the Court, this clause “require[s] legislative implementation to be effective.” This means that individuals in a protected category who are the subject of discrimination cannot currently assert their rights in court under the state constitution.

New York’s Constitution Must Advance Meaningful Equality for All People

S.517-C proposes a new section be added to the state constitution that creates robust protections against a range of invidious and unjustified forms of discrimination. This amendment achieves five important goals.

S.517-C provides tools to dismantle systemic discrimination.

First, S.517-C importantly reaches beyond acts of intentional discrimination to prohibit policies and practices that have a discriminatory effect and should, therefore, be regarded as presumptively unconstitutional.

As described above, the New York constitution’s current prohibition on discrimination has been interpreted consistently with – and no more broadly than – the federal equal protection clause. This means that the state constitutional provision is simply redundant to its federal counterpart; it also means that not all types of discrimination are captured. Under current case law interpreting the federal equal protection clause, claims are limited to those in which a plaintiff can prove intentional discrimination; in practice, this is an exceedingly high bar that excludes many meritorious cases and places the impact of historical and structural racism beyond the federal constitution’s reach. This is exactly backwards. Given our country’s history, we cannot hope to achieve true equality without accounting for, and remediying, systems of inequality and discrimination. Establishing a clear “disparate impact” standard is critical to addressing historically embedded and ongoing systems of inequality.

The state constitutional provision’s narrow reach is demonstrated by its application in the Levittown case. Levittown involved a state constitutional challenge to New York’s school funding practices. Public-school children from “property-poor” districts argued that the state system for funding schools based on property taxes impermissibly discriminated against them. Although the Court of Appeals recognized “significant inequalities in the availability of financial support for local school districts,” and that those inequalities reflected racial

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4 Dorsey, supra at 530.
5 Dorsey, supra at 530; Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 190 (1996) (Art. I §11’s first sentence is self-executing and is interpreted consistently with, and no more broadly than, the federal equal protection clause.).
disparities, the court held that these disparities deserved no special constitutional scrutiny because the system did not result from intentional racial animus.

To address unjust outcomes of the sort demonstrated by the Levittown case, S.517-C explicitly extends prohibitions of discrimination beyond intentional discrimination to also include policies and practices that unjustifiably impose a disparate impact upon protected classes of individuals. This is not new territory for legislatures or courts. Indeed, disparate impact analysis has long been incorporated and applied under federal statutory anti-discrimination law and by jurisdictions such as New York City.\(^8\)

Further, in seeking to root out systemic inequality, it is critical that we shore up New York’s ability to recognize and remedy past discrimination — including via affirmative action policies. Affirmative action programs, in which the government takes account of an individual’s protected status in order to remedy discrimination against members of that group (for example, race-conscious admissions policies), have been blessed by the Supreme Court since 1978. Over the past few decades, federal courts have narrowed the state’s permissible use of such programs, requiring the state to identify and articulate harms against a group, holding that consideration of race can be only one consideration among many in producing diversity and remedying discrimination, and requiring the government to seek “race-neutral” methods to achieve diversity and representation.\(^9\) Many scholars believe that the current Supreme Court is primed to further limit, or even eliminate, affirmative action programs. Explicitly protecting the ability to remedy systemic discrimination is therefore critical at the state level.

S.517-C includes language that protects the government’s ability to identify systemic bigotry and discrimination, and design policies, such as affirmative action, that seek to root out such discrimination.

**S.517-C prohibits discrimination against a broad range of categories — and clarifies the scope of sex discrimination in the law.**

Consistent with evolving understandings of equality, S.517-C prohibits discrimination on account of a person’s religion, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, disability, or sex including pregnancy and pregnancy outcomes, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression. And although sex discrimination should be, and frequently is, interpreted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and pregnancy outcomes, explicitly including that language here is critical to comprehensively addressing and ending sex discrimination.

History is clear: sex discrimination is inextricably intertwined with pregnancy and the capacity to become pregnant.\(^10\) And while federal courts, Congress, and the EEOC have recognized that sex discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy within the meaning of federal statutes, a lack of clarity still exists as to whether pregnancy discrimination violates the federal and state constitutions.\(^11\) In addition, in virtually every

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\(^10\) Historically women have been the target of pregnancy discrimination. The NYCLU recognizes that individuals who are not women face discrimination because of their capacity to become pregnant and pregnancy, including, but not limited to, non-binary individuals and transgender men.

\(^11\) *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding an otherwise comprehensive state insurance program that excluded pregnancy benefits did not violate the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of sex discrimination.)
state across the country, including New York, women increasingly face criminal and civil
consequences in relationship to their pregnancies and pregnancy outcomes, including
abortions, miscarriages, stillbirths, or other adverse outcomes.\textsuperscript{12}

The misapplication of criminal laws (such as murder, assault, child endangerment, and
concealing birth) to pregnant people for the loss of their own pregnancy constitutes sex
discrimination. These punishments specifically target women who are or have been pregnant
by seeking to penalize them for behavior that would not have been punished as harshly, or
even at all, had they not been pregnant. When the state polices pregnancy outcomes, it
maintains outmoded conceptions of womanhood and reinforces the idea that some women who
experience adverse pregnancy outcomes should be treated with compassion and dignity and
others should be punished. This is particularly true for women at the intersection of multiple
marginalized identities, namely Black women and other women of color, who are not only seen
as less deserving of or fit for motherhood but experience disproportionate discrimination in our
criminal law and healthcare systems.

No recognizable state objective is served by punishing women for their pregnancy outcomes.
Indeed, virtually all major public health and medical organizations in the U.S. have protested
the criminalization of pregnant women and urged lawmakers and law enforcement to view
these issues as matters of public health rather than crime.\textsuperscript{13} Punitive approaches deter women
from seeking health care, including prenatal care; treatment for substance use disorders; or
even emergency treatment for a spontaneous miscarriage.\textsuperscript{14} When confronted with this
evidence, the state’s true intent becomes clear: surveilling, policing, and locking up women for
perceived deviations from gendered social expectations.

To be sure, opponents of gender equality may focus attention on abortion in an attempt to
make this amendment a social wedge issue. However, courts have already made abundantly
clear that discriminating against people who do not want to continue a pregnancy implicates

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\textsuperscript{12} Lynn M. Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin, \textit{Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the
women-pro-life-abortion.html}.

\textsuperscript{13} Major medical organizations oppose prosecution and punishment of pregnant women, including the
American Medical Association, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American
Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Family Physicians, National Perinatal Association, March of
Dimes, and the American Public Health Association. See, \textit{Medical and Public Health Group Statements
Opposing Prosecution and Punishment of Pregnant Women}, NATIONAL ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN,

\textsuperscript{14} Neither maternal health nor a child’s health are served by arresting pregnant women for using a
controlled substance. While our state must encourage and support conditions of safety and health during
pregnancy, a carceral approach has proven to be counterproductive and, because of this, is widely rebuked by
established medical organizations. See April L. Cherry, \textit{Shifting Our Focus from Retribution to Social
HEALTH 6, 24 (2015).
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equality principles and already constitutes sex discrimination.\textsuperscript{15} This amendment further makes clear that punishing and prosecuting women because they are pregnant or have an adverse pregnancy outcome is not only the wrong policy response from a public health perspective, it is sex discrimination.

S.\textit{517-C} strikes the right balance to protect against religious discrimination and ensure religious freedom.

S.\textit{517-C} prohibits discrimination based on religion, expands current constitutional protections against religious discrimination by expanding prohibitions to private employers and providers of public accommodation, and importantly maintains the current balance that courts have struck when considering religious liberty claims.

The free exercise of religion encompasses not only the right to believe, or not to believe, but also the right to express and manifest religious beliefs. These rights involve the fundamental exercise of autonomy and association. But the exercise of religious beliefs can come into conflict with laws of general applicability and with laws prohibiting other forms of discrimination.

The risk of heightening protections for religion beyond the existing equal protection doctrine is illustrated by recent case law applying federal and state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs), which have been invoked in ways that diminish protections for women and members of the LGBTQ communities. For example, in 2014 the Supreme Court held that for-profit, closely-held corporations were exempted from providing contraceptive insurance coverage to employees under the federal RFRA.\textsuperscript{16} Similar RFRA and constitutional first amendment claims have been made to deny gender-based medical care, refuse services in places of public accommodation, skirt labor protections, and to avoid compliance with laws protecting against child abuse.

S.\textit{517-C} smartly avoids these types of conflicts by separating the protections for religious discrimination, prohibiting religious discrimination that is intentional in nature, and clarifying that Article I, Section 3 of the New York constitution\textsuperscript{17} governs claims of religious discrimination.

In doing so, S.\textit{517-C} does not diminish the invidious nature of religious discrimination. Indeed, such invidious discrimination will continue to be prohibited precisely as it historically has been in New York State. New York’s highest court has acknowledged that our state constitution’s free exercise clause is even more protective than the federal first amendment.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.}, 573 U.S. 682 (2014).

\textsuperscript{17} NY State Constitution, Freedom of worship; religious liberty, §3 states: “The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all humankind; and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his or her opinions on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.” (Amended by vote of the people November 6, 2001.)

And religious freedom remains a fundamental human right guaranteed and robustly protected by Article I, Section 3 of the state constitution, as well as the federal first amendment’s free exercise and establishment clauses.

By ensuring that the constitutional guarantee to be free from religious discrimination covers private actors, this amendment retains New York’s robust protection against religious discrimination while expanding its reach.

S.517-C prohibits discrimination in the public realm.

Systems of oppression and inequality in the United States rely on the cooperation, consent, and power of private actors to flourish. S.517-C applies against the state, entities acting in concert with or on behalf of the state, as well as any private entity in its provision of public accommodations, employment, or personnel practices. This ensures that discrimination and bigotry have no place in our public spaces.

S.517-C is an effective tool to combat discrimination.

Lastly, S.517-C expressly provides that the constitutional promise set forth in Article I, Section 19 shall be self-executing and shall not require implementing legislation to be enforceable. As noted, prior decisions by New York’s highest court have interpreted the existing constitutional equality protections to require specific legislation before people may vindicate their individual rights. Individuals in a protected category who are the subject of discrimination should be able to assert the rights that arise from the provision in court. S.517-C provides more than a mere statement of values; it creates a practical tool by which citizens can hold government actors accountable to commitments of equality.

Of course, New York has robust statutory anti-discrimination protections in our human rights law and civil rights statutes. Amending the equality provision does not diminish these protections; it enhances them. The goal of amending the current equality provision – and retaining the word “discrimination” as a specific term used by the courts – will ensure that these protections, and the way that courts have interpreted them, remain in place. And these protections will be elevated to our state’s founding document – the New York Constitution – where they belong.

The NYCLU strongly supports passage of S.517-C and urges the legislature to act – the time to move toward equality is always now.

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19 See NY State Constitution, supra note 16.

20 The first amendment of the federal constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

21 Dorsey, 299 N.Y. 512 (holding that privately owned housing projects are not bound by Art. I §11 of N.Y. Const. and can discriminate on the basis of race. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by relying (i) on the text, which protects only against “discrimination in . . . civil rights” and (ii) the record of the relevant constitutional convention. That record demonstrated “that the provision in question was not self-executing and that it was implicit that it required legislative implementation to be effective” and that the “civil rights protected by the clause in question were those already denominated as such in the Constitution itself, the Civil Rights Law or in other statutes.”); see also Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 190.

22 See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.